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HomeMy WebLinkAboutStarpower, The U.S. & the International Quest for Fusion Energy, Summary 1987The US. and the International Quest For Fusion Energy Ree eee mee ies d Ree Cena) ‘ Office of Technology Assessment Congressional Board of the 100th Congress MORRIS K. UDALL, Arizona, Chairman TED STEVENS, Alaska, Vice Chairman Senate ORRIN G. HATCH Utah CHARLES E. GRASSLEY lowa EDWARD M. KENNEDY Massachusetts ERNEST F. HOLLINGS South Carolina CLAIBORNE PELL Rhode Island WILLIAM J. PERRY, Chairman H&Q Technology Partners DAVID S. POTTER, Vice Chairman General Motors Corp. (Ret.) EARL BEISTLINE Consultant CHARLES A. BOWSHER General Accounting Office House GEORGE E. BROWN, JR. California JOHN D. DINGELL Michigan CLARENCE E. MILLER Ohio DON SUNDQUIST Tennessee AMO HOUGHTON JOHN H. GIBBONS (Nonvoting) Advisory Council CLAIRE T. DEDRICK California Land Commission S. DAVID FREEMAN Lower Colorado River Authority MICHEL T. HALBOUTY Michel T. Halbouty Energy Co. CARL N. HODGES University of Arizona Director JOHN H. GIBBONS New York RACHEL McCULLOCH Brandeis University CHASE N. PETERSON University of Utah JOSEPH E. ROSS Congressional Research Service The Technology Assessment Board approves the release of this report. The views expressed in this report are not necessarily those of the Board, OTA Advisory Council, or individual members thereof. The U.S. and the International Quest For STAR =; POWER Co OVERVIEW cacllltts acetic = ae race: Potential Role of Fusion ............ theyPolicy, Context) Magma crac Findings) se+ pee Heceeee ee esacee I ol! ee teense ts peecceen Establishing Fusion’s Feasibility....... Probability of Success .............. The Fusion Reaction ............... Requirements for Fusion Reactions ... Confining Fusion Plasmas ........... History of Magnetic Confinement Fusion 1950stand 1960s 20)... a. wo 1970svandi 1980s ee ecerel asics Fusion Science and Technology ....... Confinement Concepts ............. Reactor Development .............. Future Plans and Facilities........... Schedules and Budgets ............. Status of the World Programs........ Fusion as an Energy Program.......... Safety? acento eseeieate se = ate Environmental Characteristics ........ Nuclear Proliferation Potential ....... Resource Supplies ................. Ry ees eee ee Fusion’s Energy Context ............ Fusion as a Research Program......... Near-Term Benefits ................ ntents RESearehic ccc Ms eerste teltecens Welle evere Ie Near-Term Financial and Personnel Needs ...............-00 ee cee eee eee eens Participation in the Magnetic Fusion Program.............0 00 eee eee eee eee Fusion as an International Program..... Opportunities for Increased Collaboration ..............0 0.00 cece ee eee eee Benefits and Liabilities of Cooperation Obstacles to International Cooperation The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor ..............-..02-55 Figures Figure No. 1§ Historical Funding?1951-87/ (in 1986) dollars)hasaadasore ss) sear = =e 2. Historical Funding, 1951-87 (current dollars) ................ 2. cess cece ee eee 3. The D-T Fusion Reaction and a Fission EO cic nin es Hee a ap pee 4. Systems in a Fusion Electric Generating Station............... 00. cece eee eee 5. Systems in the Fusion Reactor Core . . 6. Annual Appropriations of DOE Energy OT RON Us cease 6 ol Mm a wae aco Table Table No. 1. Classification of Confinement Concepts Page 12 is 20 Page Foreword Fusion research, offering the hope of an energy technology with an essentially un- limited supply of fuel and relatively attractive environmental impacts, has been con- ducted worldwide for over three decades. In the United States in recent years, increased budgetary pressures, along with a decreased sense of urgency, have sharpened the competition for funding between one research program and another and between energy research programs and other components of the Federal budget. This Report, requested by the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology and endorsed by the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, reviews the status of mag- netic confinement fusion research and compares its progress with the requirements for development of a useful energy technology. It does not analyze inertial confine- ment fusion research, which is overseen by the House and Senate Armed Services Com- mittees. OTA analyzed the magnetic fusion research program in three ways: (1) as an energy program, by identifying important features of the technology and discussing its possi- ble role in the energy supply mix; (2) as a research program, by discussing its role in training scientists and developing new fields of science and technology; and (3) as an international program, by reviewing its history of international cooperation and its prospects for even more extensive collaboration in the future. OTA could not have conducted this work without the valuable assistance it re- ceived from many organizations and individuals. In particular, we would like to thank the advisory panel members, workshop participants, and outside reviewers, who pro- vided guidance and extensive critical reviews to ensure the accuracy of the report. Responsibility for the final report, however, rests solely with the Office of Technology Assessment. JOHN H. GIBBONS Director iii Magnetic Fusion Research Advisory Panel William Carey, Panel Chair Executive Officer, American Association for the Advancement of Science Ellen Berman Executive Director Consumer Energy Council of America Linda Cohen Assistant Visiting Professor of Economics University of Washington Paul Craig Professor of Physics Department of Applied Science University of California, Davis Harold Forsen Manger of Research and Development Bechtel National, Inc. T. Kenneth Fowler Associate Director Magnetic Fusion Energy Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Melvin Gottlieb Director Emeritus Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory L. Charles Hebel Manager, Research Planning Corporate Research Technical Staff Xerox Corp. Robert Hirsch Vice President Arco Oil & Gas Co. Leonard Hyman Vice President Merrill Lynch Capital Markets Betty Jensen Nuclear and Environmental Program Manager Research and Development Public Service Electric & Gas Co. Hans Landsberg Senior Fellow Emeritus Resources for the Future Lawrence Lidsky Professor of Nuclear Engineering Massachusetts Institute of Technology Irving Mintzer Senior Associate World Resources Institute Robert Park Executive Director Office of Public Affairs American Physical Society Murray Rosenthal Associate Laboratory Director for Advanced Energy Systems Oak Ridge National Laboratory Eugene Skolnikoff Director Center for International Studies Massachusetts Institute of Technology Herbert Woodson Director Center for Energy Studies University of Texas, Austin NOTE: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the advisory panel members. The panel does not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes full responsibility for the report and the accuracy of its contents. iv OTA Project Staff on Magnetic Fusion Research Lionel S. Johns, Assistant Director, OTA Energy, Materials, and International Security Division Peter D. Blair, Energy and Materials Program Manager Gerald L. Epstein, Project Director Dina Washburn! Contractors Wilfrid Kohl — Leonard Lynn Paul Josephson Lynn Powers Fusion Power Associates Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories Administrative Staff Lillian Chapman Linda Long __ Barbara J. Carter ‘Contractor after July 1, 1987. Summary OVERVIEW Potential Role of Fusion If successfully developed, nuclear fusion could provide humanity with an effectively unlimited source of electricity that has environmental and safety advantages over other electric energy tech- nologies. However, it is too early to tell whether these advantages, which could be significant, can be economically realized. Research aimed at de- veloping fusion as an energy source has been vigorously pursued since the 1950s, and, despite considerable progress in recent years, it appears that at least three decades of additional research and development will be required before a pro- totype commercial fusion reactor can be dem- onstrated. The Policy Context The budget for fusion research increased more than tenfold in the 1970s, due largely to grow- ing public concern about environmental protec- tion and uncertainty in long-range energy sup- ply. However, a much-reduced sense of public urgency in the 1980s, coupled with the mount- ing Federal budget deficit, halted and then reversed the growth of the fusion budget. Today, the fusion program is being funded (in 1986 dol- lars) at about half of its peak level of a decade ago (see figures 1 and 2). The change in the fusion program’s status over the past 10 years has not resulted from poor tech- nical performance or a more pessimistic evalua- tion of fusion’s prospects. On the contrary, the program has made substantial progress. How- ever, the disappearance of a perceived need for near-term commercialization has reduced the impetus to develop commercial fusion energy and has tightened pressure on fusion research budgets. Over the past decade, the fusion pro- gram has been unable to maintain a constant funding level, much less command the substan- tial funding increases required for next-generation facilities. In fact, due to funding constraints, the program has been unable to complete and oper- ate some of its existing facilities. The Department of Energy (DOE) manages the U.S. fusion program, and its goal is to evaluate fusion’s technological feasibility—to determine whether or not a fusion reactor can be designed and built—early in the 21st century. A positive evaluation would enable a decision to be made at that time to construct a prototype commercial reactor. However, this schedule cannot be met under existing U.S. fusion budgets. The DOE plan requires either that U.S. budgets be in- creased substantially or that the world fusion programs collaborate much more closely on fu- sion research. Choices made over the next several years can place the U.S. fusion program on one of four fun- damentally different paths: 1. With substantial funding increases, the fu- sion program could complete its currently mapped-out research effort domestically, permitting decisions to be made early in the next century concerning fusion’s potential for commercialization. 2. At only moderate increases in U.S. funding levels, the same results as above might be attainable—although possibly somewhat delayed—if the United States can work with some or all of the world’s other major fu- sion programs (Western Europe, Japan, and the Soviet Union) at an unprecedented level of collaboration. 3. Decreased funding levels, or current fund- ing levels in the absence of extensive col- laboration, would require modification of the program’s overall goals. At these con- strained funding levels, U.S. evaluation of fusion as an energy technology would be delayed. 4. If fusion research ceased in the United States, the possibility of domestically devel- oping fusion as an energy technology would be foreclosed unless and until funding were restored. Work would probably continue abroad, although possibly at a reduced pace; resumption of research at a later time in the United States would be possible but difficult. 1 2 © Starpower: The U.S. and the International Quest for Fusion Energy Figure 1.—Historical Magnetic Fusion R&D Funding, 1951-87 (in 1986 dollars) 700 (Millions of dollars) 8 8 ; 100 -— 1955 1960 1965 1970 Year 1975 1980 1985 SOURCE: U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Research, letter to OTA project staff, Aug. 15, 1986. Findings stances, to determine whether construction of a prototype commercial fusion reactor will Here are some of the overall findings from be possible or desirable; additional time be- OTA’s analysis: yond then will be required to build, oper- © Experiments now built or proposed should, ate, and evaluate such a device. over the next few years, resolve most of the major remaining scientific uncertainties re- garding the fusion process. If those experi- ments do not uncover major surprises, it is likely—although by no means certain—that the engineering work necessary to build an electricity-producing fusion reactor can be completed successfully. ¢ Additional scientific understanding and tech- nological development is required before fu- sion’s potential can be assessed. It will take at least 20 years, under the best circum- © It is now too early to tell whether fusion re- actors, once developed, can be economi- cally competitive with other energy tech- nologies. Demonstration and commercialization of fu- sion power will take several decades after completion of the research program. Even under the most favorable circumstances, it does not appear likely that fusion will be able to satisfy a significant fraction of the Nation’s electricity demand before the middle of the 21st century. Summary ¢ 3 (Millions of dollars) Figure 2.—Historical Magnetic Fusion R&D Funding, 1951-87 (in current dollars) 500 450 400 350 250 200 150 100 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 Year SOURCE: U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Research, letter to OTA project staff, Aug. 15, 1986. ¢ With appropriate design, fusion reactors should be environmentally superior to other energy technologies. Unlike fossil fuel com- bustion, fusion reactors do not produce car- bon dioxide gas, whose accumulation in the atmosphere could affect world climate. Un- like nuclear fission—the process utilized in existing nuclear powerplants—fusion reactors should not produce high-level, long-lived radioactive wastes. © One of the most attractive features of fusion is its essentially unlimited fuel supply. The only resources possibly constraining fusion’s development might be the materials needed to build fusion reactors. At this stage of de- velopment, it is impossible to determine what materials will eventually be developed and selected for fusion reactor construction. ¢ If fusion technology is developed success- fully, it should be possible to design fusion reactors with a higher degree of safety as- surance than fission reactors. It may be possi- ble to design fusion reactors that are incapa- ble of causing any immediate off-site fatalities in the event of malfunction, natural disaster, or operator error. ¢ Potential problems with other major sources of electricity—fossil fuels and nuclear fission—provide incentives to develop alter- nate energy technologies as well as to sub- stantially improve the efficiency of energy use. Fusion is one of several technologies be- ing explored. ¢ It is unlikely that major, irreversible energy shortages will occur early in the next cen- tury that could only be ameliorated by the 4 ¢ Starpower: The U.S. and the International Quest for Fusion Energy crash development of fusion power. There is little to be gained—and a great deal to be lost—by introducing fusion before its poten- tial economic, environmental, and safety ca- pabilities are attained. Even if difficulties with other energy technologies are encountered that call for the urgent development of an alternative source of energy supply, that alternative must be preferable in order to be accepted. It would be unwise to emphasize one fusion feature—economics or safety or environmental advantages—over the others before we know which aspect will be most important for fusion’s eventual acceptance. © Due to the high risk and the long time be- fore any return can be expected, private in- dustry has not invested appreciably in fusion research and cannot be expected to do so in the near future. But, unless the govern- ment decides to own and operate fusion generating stations, the responsibility for fu- sion research, development, and commer- cialization must be transferred to private in- dustry at some stage. The nature and timing of this transition are highly controversial. ¢ Fusion research has provided a number of near-term benefits such as development of plasma physics, education of trained re- searchers, contribution to ‘‘spin-off’’ tech- nologies, and support of the scientific stat- ure of the United States. However, fusion’s contributions to these areas do not imply that devoting the same resources to other fields of study would not produce equivalent ben- efits. Therefore, while near-term benefits do provide additional justification for conduct- ing research, it is difficult to use them to justify one field of study over another. © Fusion research has a long history of success- ful and mutually beneficial international co- operation. If this tradition can be extrapo- lated in the future to an unprecedented level of collaboration, much of the remaining cost of developing fusion power can be shared among the world’s major fusion programs. ¢ International collaboration cannot substitute for a strong domestic research program. If the domestic program is sacrificed to sup- port international projects, the rationale for collaboration will be lost and the ability to conduct it successfully will be compromised. ¢ Agreeing to collaborate on fusion research, both within the U.S. Government and be- tween the U.S. Government and potential partners, will require sustained support at the highest levels of government. A variety of po- tential difficulties associated with large-scale collaborative projects will have to be re- solved, and Presidential support will be re- quired. If these difficulties can be resolved, the benefits of successful collaboration are substantial. INTRODUCTION Establishing Fusion’s Feasibility Two sequential and very different requirements must be met before fusion can be an attractive source of energy. First, fusion’s technological fea- sibility must be demonstrated by establishing the scientific and engineering understanding neces- sary to build an operating fusion reactor. Second, fusion’s commercial feasibility—development of a socially and environmentally acceptable energy source that is economically attractive compared to its alternatives—must be demonstrated. Technological feasibility has two aspects: sci- entific feasibility and engineering feasibility. Sci- entific feasibility requires generating a fusion re- action that produces at least as much energy as is required to initiate it. This milestone, called breakeven, has not yet been reached, but it is expected that existing machines will be able to reach breakeven by 1990. Simply breaking even, however, does not show that fusion can serve as a useful source of energy. Scientific feasibility requires in addition that a fusion reaction be created that has high energy gain, producing an energy output many times higher than the energy input. No existing labora- tory device has the capability to produce such Summary ¢ 5 a reaction, a task that is more significant and more difficult to achieve than breakeven. However, DOE has requested funds in its fiscal year 1988 budget to begin construction of an experiment to generate a reaction with such high gain that it should become self-sustaining, or ignited. At ignition, reactions will generate enough power to sustain the fusion process even after external heating power has been shut off. Demonstrating fusion’s scientific feasibility by reaching high energy gain or ignition will set the stage for proving fusion’s engineering feasibility. Engineering feasibility entails developing all the components, systems, and subsystems needed for a fusion reactor. These components and systems must furthermore function reliably under future reactor operating conditions. Although scientific feasibility and engineering feasibility involve different issues, demonstrating either one requires advances to be made in both basic science and technological capability. Ad- vancing scientific understanding of the fusion process requires improved technological capa- bilities in experimental facilities, and solving the engineering problems posed by fusion reactor de- sign requires additional basic scientific under- standing. The goal of fusion research is to establish fu- sion’s technological feasibility in a manner that makes commercial feasibility likely. Although dependent on the technical results of fusion re- search, demonstrating fusion’s commercial fea- sibility also involves factors unrelated to the tech- nology itself, such as the status of other energy technologies and the regulatory and licensing structure. Commercial feasibility ultimately will be determined by individuals and institutions that are not involved directly in fusion research. Probability of Success Experiments now existing or proposed to be built should be sufficient, within the next few years, to demonstrate fusion’s scientific feasibil- ity. If these experiments do not uncover unfavor- able surprises, it appears likely—although not cer- tain—that fusion’s engineering feasibility can be subsequently established. Most of the technologi- cal and engineering challenges to designing and building a reactor have been identified. How- ever, it cannot yet be determined whether or not a fusion reactor will be commercially attractive. The Fusion Reaction In a fusion reaction, the nuclei—or central cores —of atoms combine or fuse together. The total mass of the final products is slightly less than the total mass of the original nuclei, and the differ- ence, less than 1 percent of the original mass, is released as energy. In a sense, fusion is the op- posite of fission, the process utilized in existing nuclear powerplants (see figure 3). In a fission re- action, energy is released when a heavy nucleus splits into smaller pieces whose total mass is slightly less than that of the original nucleus. Only light elements can release energy through fusion, and the fusion reaction that can be used most easily to generate power involves the light- est element, hydrogen (H). Three forms, or iso- topes, of hydrogen exist: protium, which is usu- ally referred to simply as hydrogen, deuterium (D), and tritium (T). Over 99.98 percent of all hydrogen found in nature is the protium isotope. The remainder, less than one part in 6,700, is com- posed of deuterium. Tritium is radioactive, with a half-life of 12% years.’ It is practically nonexist- ent in nature, but it can be manufactured. The easiest fusion reaction combines deuterium and tritium to form helium and a free neutron. (This reaction is the one illustrated in figure 3.) Four-fifths of the energy released in this reaction —called the D-T reaction—is carried off as kinetic energy by the neutron. The most straightforward application of fusion power will be to convert this kinetic energy into heat, which can be used to make steam to generate electricity. Requirements for Fusion Reactions Fusion reactions can only occur when the re- quirements of temperature, confinement time, and density are simultaneously satisfied. The min- imum temperatures, confinement times, and den- ‘Radioactive materials decay over time as the nuclei of radioactive atoms emit radiation and transform into other nuclei. The decay rate is measured by the substance’s half-life, which is the time re- quired for half of the nuclei to be transformed. 6 ¢ Starpower: The U.S. and the International Quest for Fusion Energy Figure 3.—The D-T Fusion Reaction and a Fission Reaction MeV: million electron volts SOURCE: Adapted from Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory, Information Bulletin NT-1: Fusion Power, 1984, p. 2; Office of Technology Assessment (fission), 1987. Summary ¢ 7 sities needed to produce fusion power have been known for decades. Achieving these conditions in experiments, however, has proven extremely difficult. Because the nuclei that must fuse have the same electrical charge, they repel each other. They must be heated to temperatures on the or- der of 100 million degrees Celsius (C) before they become energetic enough to overcome this repulsion. No matter exists in solid form at fu- sion temperatures; individual atoms are broken down—ionized—into their constituent electrons and nuclei. Matter in this state is called plasma. If a plasma cools too rapidly, it will require ex- orbitant amounts of heat to maintain fusion tem- peratures. The cooling rate of a plasma is meas- ured by its confinement time, or the length of time in which the plasma would cool down by a certain fraction if no additional heat were added. With an insufficient confinement time, it will be impossible to reach breakeven or ignition. Confinement times of about 1 second are gen- erally needed for an ignited plasma. The exact confinement time requirement de- pends on plasma density. The fusion reaction rate, and therefore the amount of fusion power produced by the plasma, goes down rapidly as density drops. The higher the density, the smaller the confinement time needed to produce net power. The product of density and confinement time, called the Lawson parameter, must exceed a minimum threshold in order for a fusion plasma to produce power. Confining Fusion Plasmas A fusion plasma cannot be contained in an or- dinary vessel, no matter how hot the vessel is heated, because the plasma will be instantly cooled far below the minimum temperature re- quired for fusion whenever it comes into contact with the vessel walls. There are three primary ways to hold a plasma that avoid this obstacle. Only one of these—magnetic confinement—is dis- cussed to any appreciable extent in this assessment. Magnetic confinement fusion relies on the fact that because individual particles in a plasma are electrically charged, their motion is strongly af- fected by magnetic fields. Plasma particles do not travel easily across magnetic field lines. Many different magnetic field configurations might be able to confine plasmas well enough to produce fusion power, and a variety are under investi- gation. A second way to confine a fusion plasma— gravitational confinement—is the process that takes place in stars, which are so massive that the temperatures and densities in their interiors are sufficient for fusion reactions to occur. This ap- proach cannot be utilized on earth. A third approach—inertial confinement—is the basis of the hydrogen bomb and is currently being stud- ied to see whether it can be used in a controlled manner in the laboratory. Because of the direct links between inertial confinement fusion and hydrogen bomb design, many of the near-term applications of this approach are military and much of the research is classified. HISTORY OF MAGNETIC CONFINEMENT FUSION RESEARCH 1950s and 1960s From 1951 until 1958, fusion research was con- ducted by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in a secret program code-named ‘‘Project Sherwood.”’ Many different magnetic confine- ment concepts were explored during the early 1950s. Although researchers were careful to note that practical applications lay at least 10 to 20 years in the future, the devices being studied were thought to be capable of leading directly to a commercial reactor. In reality, however, very little was known about the behavior of plasma in experiments and even less about how it would act under the conditions required for fusion reactors. Experimental results were often ambiguous or misinterpreted, and the theoretical understanding underlying the research was not well established. By 1958—as people 8 ¢ Starpower: The U.S. and the International Quest for Fusion Energy realized that harnessing magnetic fusion was go- ing to be difficult and that national security con- siderations were less immediate—the research was declassified. This action made widespread international cooperation in fusion research pos- sible, particularly since the countries involved realized that the state of their research programs was more or less equivalent. With the optimism of the 1950s tempered, fu- sion researchers in the United States proceeded at a steady pace throughout the 1960s. In 1968, Soviet scientists announced a major breakthrough in plasma confinement in a device called a ‘‘toka- Photo credit: Los Alamos National Laboratory mak.”’ After verifying Soviet results, the other Perhapsatron, built and operated in the 1950s at world fusion programs redirected their efforts Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. toward development of the tokamak. Photo credit: Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory Model C Stellarator at Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory. Designed and built in the late 1950s, the Model C was converted into the United States’ first tokamak in 1970. Summary ¢ 9 1970s and 1980s With the identification of the tokamak as a con- finement concept likely to reach reactor-level conditions, the U.S. fusion program grew rapidly. Between 1972 and 1979, the fusion program’s budget increased more than tenfold. This growth was due in part to uncertainty in the early 1970s concerning long-range energy supply; fusion energy, with its potentially inexhaustible fuel sup- ply, appeared to be an attractive alternative to exhaustible resources such as oil and gas. In addi- tion, the growth of the environmental movement and increasing opposition to nuclear fission tech- nology drew public support to fusion as an energy technology that might prove more environmen- tally acceptable than other energy technologies. The fusion program capitalized on this public support; program leadership placed a high pri- ority on developing a research plan that could lead to a demonstration reactor. Planning began for the Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor, a new ex- periment using D-T fuel that would reach breakeven. By 1974, the funding increases nec- essary to pursue accelerated development of fu- sion were appropriated. Program organization changed twice during the 1970s. In 1974, Congress abolished the AEC and transferred its energy research programs to the newly created Energy Research and Develop- ment Administration (ERDA). ERDA assumed management of the AEC’s nuclear fission and fu- sion programs, as well as programs in solar and renewable technologies, fossil fuels, and conser- vation. Three years later, President Carter incor- porated the functions of ERDA into a new agency, the Department of Energy (DOE). Under DOE, the fusion program did not have the same sense of urgency. Fusion could not mit- igate the short-term oil and gas crisis facing the United States. Furthermore, as a potentially in- exhaustible energy source (along with solar energy and the fission breeder reactor), fusion was not expected to be needed until well into the next century. Therefore, there appeared to be no com- pelling reasons to rapidly develop a fusion dem- onstration plant. Nevertheless, the Magnetic Fusion Energy Engi- neering Act of 1980 urged acceleration of the na- tional effort in magnetic fusion research, devel- opment, and demonstration activities. The act recommended that funding levels for magnetic fusion double (in constant dollars) within 7 years. However, Congress did not appropriate these in- creases, and there was no follow-up. Actual ap- propriations in the 1980s have not grown at the levels specified in the act; in fact, since 1977, they have continued to drop in constant dollars. Despite constrained funding, the U.S. fusion program has made significant advances in plasma physics and fusion technology throughout the 1980s. However, DOE has had to adjust its long- range planning to the new fiscal situation. In 1985, it issued the Magnetic Fusion Program Plan (MFPP), which states that the goal of the fusion program is to establish the scientific and techno- logical base required for fusion energy. This plan explicitly recognizes that: . .. although the need for and desirability of an energy supply system based on the nuclear fu- sion principle have not diminished, there is less urgency to develop such a system.? The plan emphasizes the importance of interna- tional collaboration if the United States is to estab- lish fusion’s technological feasibility during the early 21st century. 2U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Research, Magnetic Fusion Program Plan, DOE/ER-0214, February 1985, preface. FUSION SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Great scientific progress has been made in the field of fusion research over the past 35 years. The fusion program appears to be within a few years of demonstrating breakeven, an event that will show an impressive degree of understand- ing and technical capability. Nevertheless, many 10 © Starpower: The U.S. and the International Quest for Fusion Energy eG 2a misses Photo credit: Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory The Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor at Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory where breakeven experiments are scheduled for 1990. scientific and technological issues must be re- solved before fusion reactors can be designed and built. The principal scientific uncertainties involve what happens to a plasma when it generates ap- preciable amounts of fusion power. Because no existing devices can produce significant amounts of power, this uncertainty currently cannot be ex- plored. Simply reaching breakeven will not re- solve the uncertainties, since the effects of inter- nally generating fusion power will not be fully realized under breakeven conditions. An ignited plasma, or at least one with high energy gain, must be studied. Confinement Concepts Besides the behavior of ignited plasmas, the characteristics, advantages, and disadvantages of various confinement concepts need further study. Several different concepts, utilizing different con- figurations of magnetic fields and different meth- ods of generating the fields, are being studied (table 1). At this stage of the research program, it is not known which confinement concepts can form the basis of an attractive fusion reactor. The toka- mak is the most developed concept, and it has attained plasma conditions closest to those re- quired in a fusion reactor. Its experimental per- formance has been encouraging, and it provides a standard for comparison to other concepts. Studies of reactor-like plasmas must be done in tokamaks because no other concept has yet dem- onstrated the potential to reach reactor condi- tions. Most fusion technology development takes place in tokamaks as well. Although tokamak be- havior has not yet been fully explained theoreti- Summary ¢ 117 Table 1.—Classification of Confinement Concepts Well-developed Moderately developed Developing knowledge base knowledge base knowledge base Conventional Tokamak Advanced Tokamak Spheromak Tandem Mirror Stellarator Field-Reversed Configuration Dense Z-Pinch Reversed-Field Pinch SOURCE: Adapted from Argonne National Laboratory, Fusion Power Program, Technical Planning Activity: Final Report, com- missioned by the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Fusion Energy, ANL/FPP-87-1, 1987, p. 15. cally, it may well be possible to design reactor- scale tokamaks on the basis of experimental per- formance in smaller tokamaks. Research on alternatives to the tokamak con- tinues because it is not clear that the tokamak will result in the most attractive or acceptable fu- sion reactor. Moreover, research conducted on different concepts provides important insights into the fusion process. It remains to be seen which alternate concepts will be able to reach the level of performance already attained by the tokamak, whether their relative strengths will be preserved in the development process, and what the costs of developing these concepts to reactor scale will be. Nor is it known what the ultimate capability of the tokamak concept will be. Reactor Development Just as an automobile is much more than spark plugs and cylinders, a fusion reactor will contain many systems besides those that heat and con- fine the plasma. Fusion’s overall feasibility will depend on all of the ‘“engineering details” that support the fusion reaction, convert the power released in the reaction into usable energy, and ensure safe, environmentally acceptable opera- tion. Developing and building these associated systems and integrating them into a reactor will require a technological development effort at least as impressive as the scientific challenge of understanding and confining fusion plasmas. The overall fusion generating station (figure 4) consists of a fusion power core, which contains the systems that support and recover energy from the fusion reaction, and the balance of plant, which converts this energy to electricity. Fusion reactor conceptual designs typically have balance of plant systems similar to those found in exist- ing electricity generating stations. However, fusion technology may permit more advanced systems to generate electricity in a manner that is qualita- tively different from the methods in use today. The fusion power core, shown schematically in figure 5, is the heart of a fusion generating sta- tion. The systems in the core create and main- tain the plasma conditions required for fusion re- actions to occur. These technologies confine the plasma, heat and fuel it, remove wastes and im- purities, and, in some cases, drive electric cur- rents within the plasma. Other systems in the fu- sion power core recover heat from the fusion reactions, breed fuel, and provide shielding. One of the key requirements for many of these fusion power core systems is the development of suit- able materials that are resistant to the intense neu- tron radiation generated by the plasma. The envi- ronmental and safety aspects of fusion reactors depend significantly on materials choice. Future Plans and Facilities Many additional experiments and facilities will be required to investigate both scientific and tech- nological aspects of fusion. Preliminary experi- ments that investigate the basic characteristics of new confinement concepts can be done for a few million dollars or less. As concepts approach re- actor capability, successively larger facilities are required, with reactor-scale experiments costing hundreds of millions of dollars each. Obviously, the U.S. fusion program cannot afford to inves- tigate every confinement concept at the reactor scale; choices must be made on the basis of in- formation gathered at earlier stages. Additional facilities will be required to resolve general issues not identified with specific confine- ment concepts. In particular, facilities will be 12 © Starpower: The U.S. and the International Quest for Fusion Energy Figure 4.—Systems in a Fusion Electric Generating Station Fusion power core inside Balance of plant In Out ° Fuel * Waste « Replacement * Retired components components SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1987. needed to address the scientific issues associated with ignited plasmas. Many physical processes associated with ignition can be studied in ignited plasmas that only last for a few seconds; other aspects, such as fueling and removal of reaction products, will require a facility that can produce ignited plasmas lasting hundreds of seconds. Short- and long-burn ignition questions can be studied either in a single device or in two sepa- rate devices. DOE has chosen to separate them, and it has requested funds in its 1988 budget to build a short-pulse ignition facility, called the Compact Ignition Tokamak (CIT). Total costs for this device are estimated at about $360 million. CIT cannot satisfy the requirements for long pulses, materials studies, or nuclear technology testing. These needs could be addressed in sep- arate facilities and later combined (except for ma- terials testing) in a device that would integrate all the systems for the first time. Alternatively, many of these issues could be addressed and in- tegrated simultaneously in a next-generation engi- neering test reactor. Satisfying a number of pur- Rejected heat _—, Electric power out to grid Recirculated power poses simultaneously would complicate an engineering test reactor’s design and could force trade-offs between the different objectives. More- over, it is likely that each additional requirement will increase the price of the machine. Even so, a general-purpose engineering test reactor would presumably cost less than the combination of sev- eral single-purpose facilities and a subsequent system-integration device. DOE has not yet determined the features to be included in an engineering test reactor. It is com- mitted to investigating the possibility for interna- tional cooperation on the device; the U.S. Gov- ernment has proposed to the other major world fusion programs that collaborative conceptual de- sign of such a device, called the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER), be undertaken. Materials testing will require a dedicated de- vice even if a general-purpose engineering test reactor is built. To complete lifetime irradiation testing of reactor materials in a reasonable amount of time, a source of fusion neutrons sev- Summary ¢ 13 Figure 5.—Systems in the Fusion Power Core Tritium Ve Deuterium Electromagnetic radiation Neutrons Fuel pellets Tritium extraction ccc “Ash” removal and vacuum Steam generator and turbine Heat exchangers Coolant First wall g 3 z pune Fuel 38> injection a8 — =< Fe 30 Blanket 2 =i ll i! Magnets I I | Auxiliary ll | heating j 1 | H Sila catiiean Henge inlantennianwndle tlk ac ie ian des gnhceaie nit re wl Seki tan Sie tiie ls igs es Ca SOURCE: Modified from “The Engineering of Magnetic Fusion Reactors,” by Robert W. Conn. Copyright ©1983 by Scientific American, Inc. All rights reserved. eral times more intense than expected from a commercial reactor is required. While an engi- neering test reactor would duplicate conditions expected in a reactor, it would not be able to con- duct accelerated materials tests at several times the radiation levels to be found in a reactor. Schedules and Budgets A major fusion-communitywide study has iden- tified the technical tasks and facilities required to establish fusion’s technological feasibility and enable a decision to be made early in the next 14 ¢ Starpower: The U.S. and the International Quest for Fusion Energy Photo credit: GA Technologies View inside vacuum vessel of D III-D fusion device at GA Technologies, San Diego, CA. The plasma is contained within this vessel. century to start the commercialization process.3 The study estimated that the worldwide cost of this research effort would be about $20 billion. As mentioned earlier, developing fusion on this schedule will require either substantially increased U.S. funding or wide-scale collaboration among the world fusion programs. The requirements and schedule for establish- ing fusion’s subsequent commercial feasibility are more difficult to project, and they depend on fac- tors other than fusion research funding. Conceiv- ably, if the research program provides the infor- mation necessary to design and build a reactor prototype, such a device could be started early in the next century. After several years of con- 3Argonne National Laboratory, Fusion Power Program, Techni- cal Planning Activity: Final Report, commissioned by DOE, Office of Fusion Energy (OFE), ANL/FPP-87-1, 1987. struction and several more years of qualification and operation, a base of operating experience could be acquired that would be sufficient for the design and construction of commercial devices. If the regulatory and licensing process proceeded concurrently, vendors and users could begin to consider manufacture and sale of commercial fu- sion reactors sometime during the middle of the first half of the next century. From that point, it will take decades for fusion to penetrate energy markets. Even under the most favorable circum- stances, it does not appear likely that fusion will be able to satisfy a significant fraction of the Na- tion’s electricity demand before the middle of the 21st century. This schedule for demonstrating technological and commercial feasibility requires a number of assumptions. Sufficient financial support or inter- Summary ¢ 15 - Photo credit: JET Joint Undertaking The Joint European Torus, located in Abingdon, United Kingdom. national coordination must be attained so that the research needed to establish technological feasibility can be completed early in the next cen- tury. Research must proceed without major dif- ficulty and must lead to a decision to build a re- actor prototype. The prototype must operate as expected and prove convincingly that fusion is both feasible and preferable to its alternatives. Status of the World Programs The United States, Western Europe, Japan, and the Soviet Union all have major programs in fu- sion research that are at similar stages of devel- opment. Each program has built or is building a major tokamak experiment. The U.S. Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor and the European Commu- nity’s Joint European Torus are operating and are ultimately intended to reach breakeven condi- tions with D-T fuel. Japan’s JT-60 tokamak, also operational, will not use tritium fuel; it is intended to generate a “‘breakeven-equivalent’’ plasma using ordinary hydrogen and deuterium. The So- viet Union’s T-15 experiment is under construc- tion. In addition to these major devices, each of the programs operates several smaller fusion ex- periments that explore the tokamak and other confinement concepts. Each program is also de- veloping other aspects of fusion technology. FUSION AS AN ENERGY PROGRAM The long-term goal of the fusion program in the United States is to produce electricity. Fusion re- actors can also produce fuel for fission reactors by irradiating suitable materials with neutrons, but this ability is not seen as fusion’s primary ap- plication in the United States, Western Europe, or Japan. (The Soviet fusion effort does appear oriented towards producing fuel for fission re- actors.)4 4A fusion reactor that produces fissionable fuel, or one that gen- erates part of its energy from fission reactions that are induced by fusion-generated neutrons, is called a fission/fusion hybrid reactor. Although the applications and characteristics of hybrid reactors are different from those of ‘pure fusion’’ reactors that do not use or produce fissionable materials, there is little difference at present in the research required to develop the two. Differences will arise Hypothetical designs for fusion reactors that produce electricity have been studied for a num- ber of years. Since the research program is far from complete, however, current systems studies are necessarily tentative. Although these studies have been especially valuable in identifying im- provements in fusion physics or technology that appear to have the greatest potential for making fusion reactors attractive and competitive, they cannot provide a firm basis for assessing fusion’s potential as a future energy source. Nevertheless, the studies do provide a basis for projecting the at subsequent stages of research and development. This assessment focuses on pure fusion reactors; hybrid reactors are discussed briefly in app. A of the full report. 16 ¢ Starpower: The U.S. and the International Quest for Fusion Energy Photo credit: Japanese Atomic Energy Research Institute The JT-60 tokamak, located in Naki-machi, Japan. possible characteristics of fusion reactors. These projections will improve as additional knowledge and understanding enable scientists and engi- neers to better model the reactor systems. Safety If fusion development is successful, it may be possible to ensure that accidents due to mal- functions, operator error, or natural disasters could not result in immediate public fatalities. This safety would depend on passive systems or on materials properties, rather than on active sys- tems that could fail or be overridden. A number of attributes of the fusion process should make safety assurance easier for fusion reactors than for fission reactors: ¢ Fusion reactions cannot run away. Fuel will be continuously injected, and the amount contained inside the reactor chamber will only operate the reactor for a short period of time. Energy stored in the plasma at any given time can be dissipated by the vacuum chamber in which the fusion reactions take place. With appropriate choice of materials, the amount of heat produced by the decay of radioactive materials in the reactor after the reactor has been shut down should be less for fusion reactors than for fission reactors. Fusion reactors should therefore require sim- pler post-shutdown or emergency cooling systems, if any such systems are required at all. The radioactive inventory of a fusion reactor —in terms of both the total amount present in the reactor and the fraction that would be likely to be released in an accident—should Summary ¢ 17 be smaller than that of a fission reactor. Fu- sion will not generate long-lived wastes such as those produced by fission reactors. Except for tritium gas, the radioactive substances present in fusion reactors will generally be bound as metallic structural elements. e Inthe event of accidental release, fusion re- actors should not contain radioactive elements —except tritium—that would tend to be ab- sorbed in biological systems. Tritium is an inherent potential hazard, but the risk it poses is much smaller than that of the gase- ous or volatile radioactive byproducts pres- ent in fission reactors. Active tritium inven- tories in current fusion reactor designs are small enough that even their complete re- lease should not produce any prompt fatal- ities off-site. Moreover, fusion reactors oper- ating on advanced fuel cycles would not need tritium. This discussion does not imply that fission re- actors are unsafe. Indeed, efforts are underway to develop fission reactors whose safety does not depend on active safety systems. However, the potentially hazardous materials in fission reactors include fuels and byproducts that are inherent to the technology. While the tritium fuel required by a D-T fusion reactor is a potential hazard, the byproducts of fusion are not in themselves haz- ardous. Since there is much greater freedom to choose materials that minimize safety hazards for fusion reactors than there is in fission reactor de- sign, a higher degree of safety assurance should be attainable with fusion. Environmental Characteristics Fusion reactors will not be free of radioactive wastes, although the wastes that they produce should be easier to dispose of than fission wastes. Fusion reactors will not generate the long- lived and highly radioactive wastes contained in the spent fuel rods of fission reactors. Fusion wastes may have a greater physical volume than fission wastes, but they should be substantially less radioactive and orders of magnitude less harmful. The amount of radioactive waste antic- ipated from different fusion designs ranges over several orders of magnitude because it depends on the choice of materials with which the reactor is made. Special materials that do not generate intense or long-lived radioactive wastes may be developed that would make it possible to sub- stantially reduce the radioactive waste produced by a fusion reactor. Nuclear Proliferation Potential The ability of a fusion reactor to breed fission- able fuel could increase the risk of nuclear proliferation. Proliferation concerns relate to the possibility of constructing fission-based or atomic weapons. Although fusion reactors contain tritium, a material that could be used in principle to make thermonuclear weapons such as the hydrogen bomb, such weapons cannot be built by parties who do not already possess fission weapons. A reactor deriving all its energy from fusion and producing only electricity would not contain ma- terials usable in fission-based nuclear weapons, and it would be impossible to produce such ma- terials by manipulating the reactor’s normal fuel cycle. However, material usable in fission weap- ons could be produced by placing other materi- als inside the reactor and irradiating them with fusion neutrons. This procedure, in effect, would convert a pure fusion reactor into a fission/fusion hybrid reactor (see note 4, above). If such modifi- cations to the reactor structure were easily de- tected or were extremely difficult and expensive, pure fusion reactors would be easier to safeguard against surreptitious production of nuclear weap- ons material than existing fission reactors, and fu- sion reactors would therefore pose less of a proliferation risk. Resource Supplies Shortage of fuels will not constrain fusion’s prospects for the foreseeable future. Enough deuterium is contained in the earth’s waters to satisfy energy needs through fusion for billions of years at present consumption rates. Domes- tic lithium supplies should offer thousands of years worth of fuel, with vastly greater amounts of potentially recoverable lithium contained in the oceans. Materials required to build fusion reactors may pose more of a constraint on fusion’s develop- 18 © Starpower: The U.S. and the International Quest for Fusion Energy ment than fuel supply, but at this stage of research it is impossible to determine what materials will eventually be developed and selected for fusion reactor construction. No particular materials other than the fuels appear at present to be in- dispensable for fusion reactors. Cost It is currently impossible to determine whether a fusion reactor, once developed, will be economically competitive with other energy technologies. The competitiveness of fusion power will depend not only on successful com- pletion of the remaining research program but also on additional factors that are impossible to predict—e.g., plant licensability, construction time, and reliability, not to mention factors less directly related to fusion technology such as in- terest rates. Fusion’s competitiveness will also de- pend on technical progress made with other energy technologies. Fusion’s Energy Context The factors that influence how successfully fusion technology will compete against other energy technologies include how well its char- acteristics meet the requirements of potential cus- tomers (most likely electric utilities) and how well fusion compares to alternate electricity-generating technologies. A more detailed look at these fac- tors makes a number of points clear: © The overall size and composition of elec- tricity demand, by itself, should neither re- quire nor eliminate fusion as a supply op- tion. Supplies of both coal and uranium appear adequate at reasonable prices to meet high future demand in the absence of fusion.> It will be overall economics and acceptability, rather than total demand or fuel availability, which will determine the mix of energy technologies. ¢ It is unlikely that any one technology will take over the electricity supply market, bar- ring major difficulties with the others. ¢ Potential problems with currently foreseen future sources of electricity provide incen- tives to develop alternate energy technol- ogies and/or substantially improve the effi- ciency of energy use. Combustion of coal releases carbon dioxide, whose accumula- tion in the atmosphere may affect world cli- mate; this problem may make increased reli- ance on coal undesirable. Safety, nuclear waste, or nuclear proliferation concerns may continue to impair expansion of the nuclear fission option. The urgency for developing fusion, therefore, depends on assumptions of the likelihood that existing energy tech- nologies will prove undesirable in the future. ¢ There is little to be gained and a great deal to be lost if fusion is prematurely intro- duced without attaining its potential eco- nomic, environmental, and safety capabil- ities. Even in a situation where problems with other energy technologies urgently call for development of an alternative source of supply, that alternative must be preferable in order to be accepted. It would be unwise to emphasize one fusion feature—economics or safety or environmental advantages—over the others before we know which aspect will be most important for fusion’s eventual acceptance. 5Coal supplies are adequate to provide power for centuries at current rates of use. Uranium supplies should be available at a rea- sonable price until well into the next century without requiring ei- ther breeder reactors or reprocessing. Advanced, more efficient fis- sion reactors could delay the need for breeders or reprocessing still further. With the use of breeders, uranium deposits become adequate for centuries. Summary ¢ 19 FUSION AS A RESEARCH PROGRAM The ultimate objective of fusion research is to produce a commercially viable energy source. Yet, because the research program is exploring new realms of science and technology, it also pro- vides near-term, non-energy benefits. These ben- efits fall in four major categories. Near-Term Benefits 1. Development of Plasma Physics Plasma physics as a branch of science began in the 1950s, driven by the needs of scientists working on controlled thermonuclear fusion and, later, by the needs of space science and explo- ration. The field of plasma physics has developed rapidly and has synthesized many areas of physics previously considered distinct disciplines. Mag- netic fusion research funding is crucial to the con- tinuation of plasma physics research; over half of all Federal plasma physics research is funded by the magnetic fusion program. 2. Educating Scientists Educating scientists and engineers is one of the most widely acknowledged benefits of the fusion program. Over the last decade, DOE’s magnetic fusion energy program has financed the educa- tion of most of the plasma physicists produced in the United States. DOE, through its magnetic fusion program, directly supports university fu- sion programs and provides 37 fusion fellowships annually to qualified doctoral students. Training in plasma physics enables these scientists to con- tribute to defense applications, space and as- trophysical plasma physics, materials science, ap- plied mathematics, computer science, and other fields. 3. Advancing Science and Technology Many high-technology research and develop- ment (R&D) programs produce secondary ben- efits or ‘‘spin-offs.’’ Over the years, the magnetic fusion energy program has contributed to a va- riety of spin-off technologies with wide-ranging applications in other fields. Among them are su- perconducting magnet technology, high-quality vacuums, high-temperature materials, high- frequency and high-power radiofrequency waves, electronics, diagnostics and tools for scientific analysis, high-speed mainframe computers, and particle beams. Although spin-offs may benefit society, they are unanticipated results of research and should not be viewed as a rationale for con- tinuing or modifying high-technology research programs. It is impossible to predict before-the- fact which research investments will have the greatest spin-off return. 4. Stature The stature of the United States abroad bene- fits from conducting high-technology research. The United States has been at the forefront of fu- sion R&D since the program began in the 1950s. Maintaining a first-rate fusion program has placed the United States in a strong bargaining position when arranging international projects, has at- tracted top scientists from other fusion programs to the United States, and has enhanced the repu- tation of the United States in scientific and tech- nical programs other than magnetic fusion. Near-Term Financial and Personnel Needs Financial Resources The Federal R&D budget has grown steadily in the 1980s. The bulk of this growth has been driven by increases in defense spending, but non- defense R&D has also grown. The fraction of the Federal R&D budget devoted to energy, however, has been steadily declining during the 1980s. In fiscal year 1987, energy R&D is estimated to ac- count for less than 4 percent of the Federal R&D budget. Virtually all fusion research is funded by the Federal Government; due to fusion’s long-term, high-risk nature, there is little private sector in- vestment. Even though the fusion budget has fallen, in constant dollars, to less than half of its 1977 peak, magnetic fusion has fared better than many other energy programs. DOE’s energy pro- grams in nuclear fission, fossil fuels, conservation, and renewable energy technologies have lost proportionately more of their Federal support be- 20 ¢ Starpower: The U.S. and the International Quest for Fusion Energy Figure 6.—Annual Appropriations of DOE Civilian R&D Programs (in current dollars) 3.2 3.0 2.6 ZA 2.0) 1.8 T 1.6 T 1.4 1.2 1.0 Annual budget (billions of dollars) 0.8 0.6 TTT ULL LLL N N N 0.4 N = N ES N 02 HEN = N o LEN: = NE Solar/renewables Fusion Fission Fossil Conservation Year 1980 1981 RR 1982 ] 1983 HH 1984 1985 SS 1986 fi 1987 (estimate) [1988 (request) SOURCE: Argonne National Laboratory, Analysis of Trends in Civilian R&D Appropriations for the U.S. Department of Energy, 1986. cause it is believed that private sector financing is more appropriate in these cases. Figure 6 shows the budgets of DOE’s larger energy R&D pro- grams during the 1980s. Personnel Resources The fusion program currently supports approx- imately 850 scientists, 700 engineers, and 770 technicians.® These researchers work primarily at national laboratories and in university and col- ®Thomas G. Finn, Department of Energy, Office of Fusion Energy, letter to the Office of Technology Assessment, Mar. 12, 1987. The number of technicians represents only full-time staff associated with experiments; shop people and administrative staff are not included. Figures for scientists and engineers include university professors and post-doctoral appointments; graduate student employees are not included. lege fusion programs. According to estimates by DOE, the number of Ph.D. staff positions in the fusion program has declined by almost 20 per- cent since 1983. Most of the fusion researchers who have left the fusion program have found work in other research programs within DOE and the Department of Defense. Many former fusion researchers, for example, are working on Strate- gic Defense Initiative projects. Participation in the Magnetic Fusion Program The Department of Energy’s Office of Fusion Energy (OFE) conducts research through three different groups: national laboratories, colleges Summary ¢ 21 and universities, and private industry. Each of these groups has different characteristics, and each plays a unique role in the fusion program. National Laboratories It is estimated that national laboratories will conduct over 70 percent of the magnetic fusion R&D effort in fiscal year 1987. According to DOE, the laboratories are ‘a unique tool that the United States has available to carry on the kind of large science that is required to address certain prob- lems in fusion.’’? Four laboratories conduct the bulk of the Nation’s fusion research: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, CA; Los Alamos National Laboratory in Los Alamos, NM; Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Oak Ridge, TN; and Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory in Princeton, NJ. Universities and Colleges Within the fusion program, universities and col- leges provide education and training and histori- cally have been a major source of innovative ideas as well as scientific and technical advances. It is estimated that the university and college pro- grams will receive about 11 percent of the Fed- eral fusion budget directly in fiscal year 1987. In addition, they will probably receive another 2 or 3 percent through the national laboratories. Recent budget cuts have seriously affected university and college fusion programs. Over 80 percent of these programs have budgets of less than $1 million, and there are no other sources of Federal funding for fusion research to replace DOE appropriations. Since 1983, two-thirds of the university and college fusion programs have re- duced or eliminated their programs. The Univer- sity Fusion Associates, an informal grouping of individual researchers from universities and col- leges, anticipates that as many as half of the in- stitutions represented by its members will elimi- nate their fusion programs between 1986 and 1989 if the university fusion budgets are not main- tained. DOE, however, disputes this claim and projects constant budgets (corrected for inflation) for the university programs. 7John F. Clarke, Director of the DOE Office of Fusion Energy, “Planning for the Future,” Journal of Fusion Energy, vol. 4, Nos. 2/3, June 1985, p. 202. Private Industry Private industry can take a variety of different roles in fusion research, depending on its level of interest in the program and the status of fu- sion development. At the lowest level, industry can serve as an advisor to DOE and the national laboratories. As the research approaches the engi- neering stage, industry can begin to participate directly by supplying components or contracting with DOE. Ultimately, it is anticipated that in- dustry will sponsor research and development activities. To date, industry and utility involvement in magnetic fusion R&D has been advisory, with limited cases of direct participation. This is due largely to fusion’s long time horizon and the lack of predictable, easily commercializable ‘‘spin-off’”’ technologies. Most current industrial participa- tion is facilitated through subcontracts from na- tional laboratories. The transition of responsibility for fusion re- search and development from government to in- dustry is a significant hurdle to be cleared before fusion can be commercialized. Current DOE pol- icy calls for any demonstration fusion reactor to be built and operated by the private sector. In- dustries and utilities, on the other hand, may be unwilling to risk a major investment in a new and unproven technology. There is considerable controversy over the appropriate time for the private sector to be- come more involved in the research program. Some argue that the willingness of industry to in- vest in fusion technology should not be used as a criterion for determining its appropriate degree of involvement. They maintain that early involve- ment of industry in fusion research is necessary to ensure that the technology will be attractive to its eventual users and marketable by the pri- vate sector. Others counter that, given present and foreseeable future research budgets, there are not enough opportunities for the private sec- tor to develop and maintain a standing capabil- ity in fusion. These individuals believe that indus- try’s limited participation in fusion research in the near-term will not preclude its eventual role in demonstration and commercialization. 22 © Starpower: The U.S. and the International Quest for Fusion Energy Photo credit: Plasma Fusion Center, MIT The Alcator C tokamak at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. FUSION AS AN INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM The field of magnetic fusion research has a 30- year history of international cooperation. The leaders of the U.S. fusion community continue to support cooperation, as does DOE. In the past, the United States cooperated internationally in a variety of exchanges that have produced use- ful information without seriously jeopardizing the autonomy of the domestic fusion program. In re- cent years, in response to budgetary constraints and the technical and scientific benefits of co- operation, DOE has begun cooperating more in- tensively in fusion, and the major fusion programs have become more interdependent. For the fu- ture, DOE proposes undertaking cooperative proj- ects that will require the participating fusion pro- grams to become significantly interdependent: indeed, DOE now sees more extensive interna- tional cooperation as a financial necessity. Opportunities for Increased Collaboration Cooperation among the major world fusion programs can be expected to continue at its cur- rent level, at the least, as long as each of the ma- jor fusion programs maintains a level of effort sufficient to make it an attractive partner to the others. In the future, it is also possible that a sub- stantially expanded degree of collaboration may take place. Such collaboration may take two forms: joint construction and operation of major facil- ities on a scale not yet attempted among the four programs, and substantial additional joint plan- ning among the world programs to minimize redun- dant research and to maximize the transfer of in- formation and expertise among the programs. ~~“ Summary ¢ 23 Photo credit: GA Technologies The Ohmically Heated Toroidal Experiment at GA Technologies, Inc., which is the only major fusion experiment constructed and operated largely with private funds. Those who favor increased levels of collabo- ration believe that there will be important oppor- tunities over the next decade. At the same time that similarities in the status and goals of the ma- jor international fusion programs provide a tech- nical basis for expanded cooperation, the com- parable levels of achievement ensure that each program can contribute to and benefit from col- laboration. Moreover, commercial applications of fusion technology are sufficiently far off that competitive concerns should be minimal. Since the programs may not remain comparable over the long term, these pro-collaboration observers maintain that the timing may not be as advanta- geous for collaboration in the future as it is now. In particular, they worry that if recent funding trends continue, the U.S. fusion program may fall behind the other programs and might no longer be viewed as a desirable partner. Benefits and Liabilities of Cooperation International collaboration introduces a num- ber of potential benefits and liabilities to the par- ticipants. Observers will weigh these features differently, arriving at different conclusions about the value of collaboration: © Knowledge Sharing. All forms of coopera- tion involve sharing knowledge. Research- ers can take advantage of one another’s ex- perience, greatly aiding their own progress. Some observers, however, are concerned that collaboration could lead to exchange of information that has adverse implications for national security or technological competi- tiveness. © Cost Sharing. Cooperation can save the part- ners money by spreading out the costs of ex- 24 © Starpower: The U.S. and the International Quest for Fusion Energy periments among the participants and avoid- ing duplication of effort. Some additional costs may be added as a result of increased administrative complexity, but barring un- usual circumstances each partner should spend less through collaboration than it would to duplicate the research by itself. ¢ Risk Sharing. The financial and program- matic costs of a collaborative project are spread among a number of participants, min- imizing the exposure of any one of them in the event of failure. On the other hand, through collaboration, each party opens it- self up to the risk that withdrawal of any of the other partners may jeopardize the suc- cess of the entire project. A partner may also become dependent on others for the con- tinuation of its own program. Finally, some observers feel that the absence of competi- tion and duplication among experimental fa- cilities may increase the risk of technical failure. © Diplomatic and Political Implications. Col- laboration can be diplomatically motivated, because it may improve relations and in- crease familiarity between the partners. Some analysts welcome this additional as- pect of collaboration; others fear that diplo- matic motivations may override technical ones, causing a project to be undertaken that might not be judged attractive on its techni- cal merits along. © Domestic Implications. If the domestic pro- gram is neglected in order to support the col- laboration, both the ability of the partner to collaborate and the value of collaboration to that partner may be compromised. Even if the domestic program is not damaged, it will be influenced by participation in col- laboration. Becoming dependent on collabo- ration lessens the flexibility of the partners to change research direction and emphasis. On the other hand, collaboration can stabi- lize domestic efforts; the additional commit- ment given to a collaborative effort makes it more difficult for domestic contributions to that effort to be cut back. Obstacles to International Cooperation The process of organizing and executing large- scale collaboration presents challenges that must be overcome by each of the partners. Among the challenges will be siting the facility, resolving the technology transfer concerns of the parties and making them compatible with an open exchange of research results, resolving technical differences among the parties, and overcoming a variety of administrative obstacles including different in- stitutional frameworks, different budget cycles, different legal systems, and personnel needs. Negotiating and executing workable agree- ments for international collaboration will un- doubtedly be a difficult and time-consuming process. Legal and institutional frameworks must be devised that address the issues in a manner acceptable to participants in the project. The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor Currently, most of the effort in international col- laboration is focused on a proposal to develop a conceptual design for an international engineer- ing test reactor, called the International Thermo- nuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER). Estimates in- dicate that building an engineering test reactor will cost well over $1 billion and possibly sev- eral times this amount, which is far more than the U.S. fusion program has spent on any one facility in the past and is too expensive for the United States to undertake alone without substan- tial increases in fusion funding. Therefore, DOE is involved in discussions with the other world- wide fusion programs to jointly design, construct, and operate ITER. At this stage, only the conceptual design of ITER is being considered by the potential collabora- tors; the U.S. Government recently issued a pro- posal to begin a joint planning activity on a con- ceptual design for the experiment, along with supporting R&D. It is anticipated that the con- ceptual design phase of ITER will occur between Summary ¢ 25 1988 and 1990 at a total estimated cost ranging from $150 million to $200 million. The U.S. cost of the undertaking is projected to be between $15 million and $20 million annually over the 3-year program. Since the U.S. Government proposal addresses only the conceptual design phase of ITER, it makes no commitment to future construction of a collaborative experiment. Therefore, current negotiations will not address the obstacles to in- ternational collaboration that would arise if and when the decision were made to jointly construct and operate the device. At the completion of the conceptual design phase, interested parties would be in a position to begin negotiations on whether or not to proceed with construction. The existence of a conceptual design would make it easier to resolve many of the questions that would arise should a subsequent decision be made to build and operate ITER. In particular, it should be possible to analyze concerns about technol- ogy transfer specifically and determine their im- plications for national security or industrial com- petitiveness. International cooperation on the scale re- quired for ITER is unprecedented for the United States. Reaching agreement within the U.S. Gov- ernment to initiate and maintain support for ITER over the lifetime of the project will probably re- quire a Presidential decision. Even that, by itself, is insufficient to guarantee the viability of a project involving all branches of the U.S. Government and extending over several Presidential admin- istrations. At this time, DOE considers international col- laboration on the scale of ITER to be crucial. Given the seriousness of the obstacles, however, it is possible that such collaboration may not oc- cur. In the event that no major collaboration takes place, either the U.S. fusion program will have to be funded at a higher level or its sched- ule will have to be slowed down and revised. 052-003-01079-8; $10.00. NOTE: Copies of the report “Starpower: The U.S. and the International Quest for Fusion Energy” can be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402-9325, GPO stock No. 26 General Information Contacts Within OTA OTA offices are located at 600 Pennsylvania Ave., S.E., Washington, DC. 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