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HomeMy WebLinkAboutTAPS Construction - Lessons LearnedI. Overview Of The Pipeline Construction Project At the time that the Trans -Alaska Pipeline System was constructed, it constituted the world's largest privately financed construction project. The superlatives which can be ascribed to the project have been well documented by the press throughout the entire period of construction. Just about every element of construction material, manpower, and machinery involved on the project could be character- ized as the largest in existence at the time. For instance, the size and weight of the 48-inch diameter pipe of approximately 1/2 inch wall thickness required one of the largest fleets of pipelayers to be assembled in the history of pipelining. Even in civil con- struction associated with the pipeline, the massive amounts of earth moved (over 33,000,000 cubic yards for the Yukon River to Prudhoe Bay Haul Road and in excess of 25,000,000 cubic yards for the work - pad construction) made it one of the larger civil construction efforts underway at the time. Other factors also significantly affected the construction of the pipeline, not the least of which was the location in which the pro- ject was constructed. The pipeline traversed from north to south the geographic limits of the state of Alaska; starting in the semi- arid Prudhoe Bay region; crossing the Brooks Range through the Atigun Pass; descending into the Yukon River Valley; crossing the Yukon River on a joint Alyeska/State of Alaska Department of High- ways bridge; turning southeastward through the Alaska Range; cross- ing the Chugach Range; and finally descending into the Port of Valdez. Not only did the pipeline cross three significant mountain ranges, but also more than 800 rivers and streams. The weather encountered varied tremendously from one part of the project to another. It was not unusual to have a -200F. temperature with winds of 40 knots creating a windchill in excess of -60 F. at Prudhoe Bay, at the same time, have a balmy +400F. and no wind conditions at Fairbanks, and finally, a foot of snow falling at the Valdez termi- nal site. Even within the individual pipeline sections, extremely different types of weather were frequently encountered simultane- ously within a given day. Another factor which significantly impacted the constructability of the project was the sophisticated design of the pipeline. The unique situation of elevating a pipeline to prevent the degradation of permafrost created its own special problems in constructability. The design read to accuimoodate thermal expansion as well as seismic factors and the normal dead and live loads. This translated into an extremely sophisticated construction problem which called for preci- sion not normally associated with pipelining. Additionally, the design of the above -ground support system created its own logistics problems. Some 35,000 support bents were ultimately required, each bent having one of 8 different lengths of crossbeams. A total of 78,000 vertical support members (piling which supports the above -ground pipe) were placed, varying in length according to the geotechnical conditions encountered. Also, approximately 122,000 heat pipes (thermal devices which extract heat from the -2- David W. Haugen ground) were installed in the vertical ing in length. In two areas, special were required, totalling approximately sections utilized brine lines to chill buried pipeline. support members, again, vary - refrigerated burial sections five miles in length. These the ground surrounding the In terms of surveillance, the construction of the Trans -Alaska Pipe- line System was subjected to scrutiny from many different sources. One area which received much more than normal inspection was weld- ing and radiography. When completed, the welding and radiography had been submitted to more inspection than is normal for a nuclear reactor. Finally, and by no means the least of'the significant impacts on construction, was the attention that was paid to the protection of the environment. Specifications contained in the Agreement and Grant -of -Right -of -Way for the Trans -Alaska Pipeline issued by the Department of Interior, as well as the Right -of -Way Lease for the Trans -Alaska Pipeline from the State of Alaska, specified mandatory requirements for the protection of the environment. Again, these requirements greatly exceeded what had normally been standard prac- tice on pipelines. In summary, the construction feasibility of the Trans -Alaska Pipe- line System project was directly affected by the magnitude, the location, the sophisticated design, and the environmental protec- tion requirements which were applied to the project. Each of these factors contributed a to a1LU comprised d project that was unique for those trying to construct it. In order to accomplish the timely construction of the project, it was therefore necessary to create an organizational structure which could accommodate all the unique- ness of the project. II. The Changes Which Occurred To The Pipeline Project Management Organization During The Construction Effort The management of the Trans -Alaska Pipeline System would have been challenging had no changes occurred during the construction effort. To illustrate the changes which occurred and their consequent impact upon the project management organization, three areas are chosen to demonstrate the principaiS involved. These areas are: engineering, government surveillance and consrriietj_nn management. I. Engineering The first of the major areas that created management challenges was the area of different -than -anticipated geotechnical condi- tions. In spite of the efforts of the field engineers to predict the soil conditions by way of soil -boring programs, resistivity studies, terrain unit analysis, and photogrammetric interpreta- tion, many geotechnical surprises were encountered during the construction effort. Parts of the pipeline right-of-way changed significantly almost on a foot -by -foot basis in terms of the geotechnical conditions encountered. Since the above -ground -3- David W. Haugen support system was heavily dependent upon adequate bearing condi- tions for the vertical support members, these surprises created an immediate requirement for extensive redesigns as they were encoun- tered. This requirement created many construction difficulties in the way of numerous holds while the design was being modified. These geotechnical surprises also existed in the below -ground pipe- line, resulting in requirements for redesign. Consequently, the project was under a constant redesign for almost the entire con- struction period. Exhibit "A" illustrates the organizational entities and flow of paperwork which existed at the beginning of pipeline construction. A typical example which would serve to illustrate the flow of paper- work is as follows: Assume an unexpected geotechnical condition is discovered by engi- neers within one of the pipeline section offices. Assume also that the "fix" which will be required is a,_"remode" or change from buried pipeline to elevated pipeline. The originating pipeline section office would collect the necessary field data (i.e., survey and geo- technical information) and transmit it to the Fairbanks construction headquarters office. However, the Fairbanks group would have to transmit the request for remode to the Anchorage office, because governmental review for the redesign was conducted there. After review, the approved request for change was transmitted to Fairbanks for the production of the construction drawings. Finally, the originating pipeline section office would receive the "released- for -construction" drawings and proceed with the work. The number of changes which were necessary during the construction effort soon made it obvious that a more straight -forward method would have to be utilized. Consequently, Exhibit "B" shows the revised procedures which prevailed throughout the rest of the con- struction effort. The significant difference was the establishment of direct lines of communication between the pipeline section office and the Anchorage engineering headquarters. Similarly, the requirement for many field engineering design changes resulted in the establishment of a 'Large field design engineering organization. Even within the field engineering group, sections were established to handle specific problem areas. For example, several engineers were normally assigned to the above -ground pipe- line alignment since the alignment was a key construction factor. Also, the geotechnical group of the field engineering organization evolved into a large entity, due to the many geotechnical surprises encountered. Because of the many changes which were encountered, a decentralization of the engineering organization was established. A field engineering supervisor was established at each pipeline section office and given the authority and responsibility to make changes within established criteria. In addition to a formal pro- cedure composed of field engineering design changes being submitted to the headquarters office for review and approval, an expedited system was established, utilizing a telex system. -4- David W. Haugen EXHIBIT A APPROVALS ENGINEERING GOVERNMENT HEADQUARTERS MONITORING (ANCHORAGE) OFFICES (ANCHORAGE) APPROVED SUBMITTALS REQUESTS REQUESTS FOR CHANGES FOR APPROVAL CONSTRUCTION HEADQUARTERS (FAIRBANKS) 14 Q� 4ti PIPELINE SECTION OFFICE (TYPICAL) -5- David W. Haugen 44y�P`S �G�10 S� PIPELINE SECTION OFFICE (TYPICAL) EXHIBIT B APPROVALS ENGINEERING GOVERNMENT HEADQUARTERS MONITORING (ANCHORAGE) OFFICES -v- (ANCHORAGE) SUBMITTALS cn cn •• d D H O H R' F-•1 a � rr rr MILE -BY -MILE DESIGN GROUP FAIRBANKS 9.9 David W. Haugen 2. Government Surveillance The project was unique in its requirement for active surveil- lance on behalf of the federal and state monitors, as well as the standard quality assurance and quality control teams. Exhibit "C" shows the relationship between various headquarters and field organizations as it existed at the beginning of the pipeline construction for the permitting process. Virtually every step of the project was subjected to extensive review by federal and state inspectors. A formal notice to proceed procedure was followed from design through construction with the attendant requirements. Fbr those areas where the pipeline crossed federal ground, this procedure required the submission for review and approval of drawings and/or specifi- cations to the Authorized Officer (A.0.) specified in the Agreement and Grant -of -Right -of -Way for the Trans -Alaska Pipe- line with the U.S. Department of the Interior. Upon review and approval at the headquarters level, the notice to proceed was transmitted to the individual pipeline sections. At the field level, an additional notice to proceed was issued by the Authorized Officer's Field Representative (A.O.F.R.), who could further modify and change the original drawings and/or specifi- cations. A similar system existed for those areas where the pipeline crossed state ground. As the project evolved, it was obvious that direct communications between the pipeline section office and the corporate headquarters location would substan- tially reduce the time involved in applying for and receiving permits to begin construction field work. Consequently, Exhibit "D" shows the organizational arrangement which evolved for the acquisition of permits. Although this system was an improvement over the earlier organizational arrangement, the permit procedure was not fully responsive to the needs of the construction effort. Even with a direct line of communication developed between the pipeline section office and the Anchorage headquarters office, the time lag between requests for and receipt of approvals was sufficient to create breaks in the construction "cadence" or pace of the field activ- ities. Almost all of the activities performed on a cross- country pipeline follow along the right-of-way in a sequential manner. If any of the early activities, (drilling the holes for VSM's for above -ground pipeline or ditching for below -ground pipeline), are held up, then a chain reaction occurs and activi- ties which are to occur after the inital drilling or ditching are also held up. (This occurance was characterized as the "domino -effect".) These breaks in construction "cadence", multiplied by the "domino -effect" were a product of the admin- istrative procedures required by the federal and state stipu- lations. -7- David W. Haugen EXHIBIT C APPROVAL CORPORATE GOVERNMENT HEADQUARTERS MONITORING (ANCHORAGE) OFFICES ---� (ANCHORAGE) SUBMITTAL a a N O H P P+ al PERMIT LIASION (FAIRBANKS) A1' P44�O� Pti c$ APPROVAL OF FIELD NTP PIPELINE -4 --- FIELD SECTION SURVEILLANCE OFFICE OFFICE (TYPICAL) REQUEST FOR FIELD NTP —8— David W. Haugen EXHIBIT D APPROVAL CORPORATE .�----LMONITORING NT HEADQUARTERS (ANCHORAGE) SGE) SUBMITTAL APPROVAL OF FIELD NTP --�.- �u r r 1 u n I REQUEST FOR FIELD NTP 3. Construction Management The original organizational concept established for the pipe- line construction was the concept of centralization. As originally planned, all contractor correspondence would flow between the construction headquarters at Fairbanks directly to the execution contractor at each of the sections. Thus, even the area office manager, located at each section headquarters location, was not given contractual authority. This organiza- tional arrangement is shown as Exhibit "E". As the project developed and the construction work escalated to higher levels of effort, it became obvious that a log -jam of contractual correspondence was developing. Compounding this situation was the numerous changes which were becoming necessary to the design of the pipeline because of the different -than - anticipated geotechnical conditions. Encountering the problems mentioned above and their cumulative effect upon the rate of progress for the pipeline construction effort culminated in a fundamental restructuring of the pipeline Construction Depart- ment. This restructuring resulted in a change from a central- ized concept of management to one of decentralization. (See Exhibit "F".) Each pipeline section was treated as an independent organiza- tion. The project manager of the section had the full contractual authority and responsibility to insure timely con- struction of his section. Thus, the Execution Contractor for each pipeline section reported to the pipeline section project manager. This concept was called the single point of contact, or "SPOC" system. The uniqueness of the Alaskan situation, the environmental requirements, as well as the construction difficulties encoun- tered, required the establishment of a flexible and quick - reacting management effort. The authority to make a decision was a significant reason why the pipeline construction was able = to be completed on schedule. Without the flexibility of a decentralized authority system with centralized supportive ele- ments, this accomplishment would not have been possible. -10- David W. Haugen PIPELINE SECTION EXECUTION CONTRACTOR t-i I,-A7 EXHIBIT E CENTRALIZATION OF AUTHORITY CONSTRUCTION HEADQUARTERS (FAIRBANKS) -11- David W. Haugen EXHIBIT F DECENTRALIZATION OF AUTHORITY CONSTRUCTION HEADQUARTERS (FAIRBANKS) PIPELINE SECTION OFFICE DIRECTION I RESP VIVSE PIPELINE SECTION a. EXECUTION CONTRACTOR (TYPICAL) -12- Dam :.- r en III. Lessons Learned Which Can Be Applied To The Next Large Project A. Do's Start planning as soon as possible. The length of time avail- able for the development and planning phase is a vital deter- minant of a project's success. The complexity which is associated with a very large project makes a planning exercise of the highest caliber absolutely essential. The sheer size of the large-scale projects also generates a requirement for a logical schedule with realistic and attainable cost objectives. Without such control devices, once construction has commenced, the project can easily degenerate into a morass of undirected operations. A project control system is a vital part of any early planning exercise. The development of a cost conscious mentality must be emphasized at the very early stages and reiterated throughout the life of the project. The cost con- trol system need not be overly sophisticated to be effective. A similar statement could be made of the scheduling system. A far more significant factor than degree of sophistication is the time involved in retrieving data from the field and pre- senting it to management. Too often, this data must be pro- cessed through a central computerized -system, remote from the field activities. Any problems inherent in the collection of the data as well as the processing times, can make all the reporting after -the -fact and basically unusable by the field project manager. Another vital ingredient of the project control system is the establishment of a project baseline estimate. Because of the heavy impact of inflation associated with the long-term dura- tion of the major project, it is vitally important that a proper accounting be kept of the initial project conception and the events which finally equate to the final product. The establishment of the baseline estimate is absolutely essential for the recordkeeping that must take place during the changes to the basic configuration throughout the life of the project. r f The amount of time available for the planning exercise also will be a good indication of the feasibility of the final pro- duct of the planning exercise. i is far better to utilize small numbers of people who are experienced with the local conditions and spread this planning effort over a longer period of time than to attempt a crash program with large numbers -of inexperienced personnel. Again, a crucial mistake made at the early planning exercise can guarantee chaos further down the line. Also of importance is the review by "hands-on" person- nel of the "feasibility" of the planning exercise. It is important that the feasibility of the planning be subjected to as much review as possible prior to the time it will be implemented. The development of a project plan should focus initially on the actual field construction events. The crew and equipment build-ups which result from the execution of field activities are then translated into camp loading pro- jections, equipment requirements, and logistical requirements. -13- David W. Haugen Of particular significance is the levels of personnel involved in support activities. Again, the final products of the crew and equipment build-ups and logistical requirements should be subjected to as much review as feasible by "hands-on" person- nel. Another major category of the "do's" of the experiences from the Trans -Alaska Pipeline project would be to keep the organ- ization as flexible as possible. The problems that can be encountered during the planning as well as the construction effort can very likely be unique and without precedent. A fatal mistake is to presume to have anticipated all possible difficulties and to assume that the organization as structured originally is capable of overcoming these difficulties. Because of the dynamic nature of large projects, flexibility is a mandate, not an option. When changed conditions occur, a responsive effort must be made by the organization to analyze the change and to construct a method of attacking that change. This flexible nature which must be built into the organization is also a requirement for the individuals who form that organ- ization. A common fallacy is to attack a problem based upon the "30- year syndrome". The definition of "30-year syndrome" goes as follows: "I've been building pipelines for 30 years and never had to do things this way". This type of attitude must not be allowed to govern any of the crucial decisions which will be encountered during the life of the project. B. Don't's Based upon the results of experience on the Trans -Alaska Pipeline project, several things should not be done. The first major item is to not underestimate the degree of diffi- culty concerning the execution of a large scale project in a remote environment. The problems and changes which can occur to a project during its planning execution stages can pose one -of -a -kind or unique problems which may never be encountered again. Therefore, the management attitude must be in the anticipation of and the development of the resource equ�.r e— ments to handle these problems. Another major area of management concern must be the adoption of a "fallback position" philosophy. Since we have seen that the many unexpected circumstances surrounding the construction of a major project in a remote area will produce unanticipated demands, organize so that an alternate game plan may be adopted, should certain events occur. Again, such a plan need not be formalized, or for that matter, very sophisticated, but thinking has to be geared to the definite probability of encountering certain negative surprises. Again, the fatal flaw which would characterize some organizations would be the adoption of a rigid policy and no flexibility delegated to the field level. A very fundamental lesson learned on the con- struction of the Trans -Alaska Pipeline System was the necessity -14- David W. Haugen for the decentralization of management to the field level. Without such a system, the decision -making necessary to con- duct a smooth -running construction operation on a day-to-day basis in remote locations is not attainable. IV. Summary The demands inherent with the degree of difficulty associated with the construction of a large project in a remote location call for the establishment of a highly competent, adaptable management team. Determinants of project success are management factors, things which management has the potential to influence. Management must be equipped to deal decisively with problems as they arise, even to the point of drastic changes within the organization, on a regular basis. Flexibility must characterize both the organization and the individuals within it. -15- David W. Haugen